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Presidential Address: Will This Policy
Work for You? Predicting Effectiveness
Better: How Philosophy Helps
Nancy Cartwright*
There is a takeover movement fast gaining inﬂuence in development economics, a move-
ment that demands that predictions about development outcomes be based on random-
ized controlled trials. The problem it takes up—of using evidence of efﬁcacy from good
studies to predict whether a policy will be effective if we implement it—is a general one,
and affects us all. My discussion is the result of a long struggle to develop the right con-
cepts to deal with the problem of warranting effectiveness predictions. Whether I have it
right or not, these are questions of vast social importance that philosophers of science can,
and should, help answer.
1. AFocus onDevelopment Economics. TheWorld Bank estimates that in
developing countries 178 million children under age 5 are stunted in growth
and 55 million are underweight for their height (World Bank 1995). Malnu-
trition leaves children vulnerable to severe illness and death and has long-
term consequences for the health of survivors. The bank has funded a wide
range of nutritional interventions in developing countries, in Latin America,
the Caribbean, Africa, and East and South Asia. This included the Bangla-
desh Integrated Nutrition Project (BINP), modeled on its acclaimed prede-
cessor, the Indian Tamil Nadu Integrated Project (TINP).What was integrated?
Feeding, health measures, and, centrally, education of pregnant mothers about
how better to nourish their children.
TINP covered the rural areas of districts with the worst nutritional sta-
tus, about half the Tamil Nadu state, with a rural population of about 9 mil-
lion. Malnutrition fell at a signiﬁcant rate. The World Bank Independent
Evaluation Group concluded that half to three-fourths of the decline in TINP
areas was due to TINP and other nutrition programs in those areas.
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TheBangladesh Project wasmodeled on TINP. But Bangladesh’s project had
little success. A Save the Children UK assessment concludes that program
areas and nonprogram areas still had the same prevalence of malnutrition af-
ter 6 years, despite the fact that the targeted health educational lessons sank in
to some extent: Caregivers in the BINP areas had on thewhole greater knowl-
edge about caring practices than those in non-BINP areas. Why then did the
project fail in Bangladesh?
Before that we had better ask: Why should it have been expected to suc-
ceed? The extrapolation to Bangladesh from uncontroversial success in India
was not warranted, I shall argue, because it was based on simple induction;
and simple induction is no better a method in social science than in natural
science and no better in policy science than in pure science. Moreover, we
can do better, and often with knowledge already at hand.
My talk will concentrate on development economics and on a vigorous
takeover movement fast gaining inﬂuence there, a new methodology to im-
prove development outcomes: randomized controlled trials (RCTs). As a
Public Radio International interview reports, “A team of economists at [Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology] says it’s time for a new approach—one
that makes prescriptions for poverty as scientiﬁcally-based as prescriptions
for disease” (http://www.pri.org/theworld/?q5node/10887). MIT’s Esther
Duﬂo is one of the leaders of this movement. She tells us that “the last few
years have seen a veritable explosion of randomized experiments in devel-
opment economics” (Banerjee and Duﬂo 2009) and that “creating a culture
in which rigorous randomized evaluations are promoted, encouraged, and ﬁ-
nanced has the potential to revolutionize social policy during the 21st cen-
tury” (Duﬂo, quoted by Lancet 2004, 731). Witness also the recent Journal
of Economic Perspectives symposium on a paper commending RCTs by
my London School of Economics colleague Steve Pischke and another MIT
economist, Joshua Angrist. They cite one exemplar of good research design:
“in a pioneering effort to improve child welfare, the Progresa program in
Mexico offered cash transfers to randomly selected mothers, contingent on
participation in prenatal care, nutritional monitoring of children, and the chil-
dren’s regular school attendance” (Angrist and Pischke 2010, 4). They add,
quoting Paul Gertler, one of Progresa’s original investigators, that “Progresa
is why now thirty countries worldwide have conditional cash transfer pro-
grams” (4). That’s serious extrapolation!
And, to see why I am concerned: Even since I wrote this in draft I have
learned that the father of Progresa, Santiago Levy, says that many of the
places that want conditional cash transfer programs are places where they
will obviously fail. In some of these countries success would require people
to go to clinics that do not exist (Deaton 2010, 449).
Here’s another, from the Jamil Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), which Duﬂo
and other MIT economists work with: the Deworm the World Movement.
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The J-PAL website reports that “Research by J-PAL associates . . . Kremer
and . . . Miguel has shown that school-based deworming is one of the most
cost-effective methods of improving school participation” (http://www
.povertyactionlab.org/scale-ups/school-based-deworming). The Kremer
and Miguel study looked at 75 primary schools in Busia, Kenya. Busia, the
J-PAL website explains, “is a poor and densely-settled farming region in
western Kenya adjacent to Lake Victoria. [It has] some of the country’s
highest [intestinal worms] infection rates, in part due to the area’s proximity
to Lake Victoria Kenya.” The website goes on: “The evidence from [the
Kremer and Miguel] study has helped inform the debate and has contributed
to the scale-up of school-based deworming across 26 countries where over
7 million children have been dewormed since 2009.” I focus on development
and onRCTs. But the problem of using evidence of efﬁcacy fromgood studies
and pilots to predict whether a policy will be effective if implemented is a
general one. And it is a megaproblem. It affects us all. This megaproblem,
like a good many other problems involving the practice and use of science,
is one philosophers of science can contribute to. We are in a position to step
in and help, and we should. If we don’t step forward to act to improve the
decisions that inﬂuence all our lives, what is philosophy good for? So let’s
look at some philosophy that can help. I start with a familiar philosophical
concern.
2. Let’s Get Straight What We Are Talking About. RCTs, proponents
argue, are the ‘gold standard’ for warranting causal claims. But there’s star-
tlingly little attention to what these claims claim. In particular, there’s wide-
spread conﬂation of three distinct kinds of causal claims. RCTs are especially
good only for the ﬁrst: (1) It works somewhere. (2) It works in general. (3) It
will work for us. Here’s a typical example from a paper by Duﬂo and Kremer
(2005, 205). Already in line 5, in one single sentence, all three kinds of claims
are mixed together without note: “The beneﬁts of knowing which programs
work . . . extend far beyond any program or agency, and credible impact eval-
uations . . . can offer reliable guidance to international organizations, govern-
ments, donors, and . . . NGO’s beyond national borders.” I take it from the
language and use that they mean as follows:
• Which programs work 5 It works in general.
• Impact evaluation 5 It works somewhere.
• Reliable guidance 5 It will work for us.
I focus on these three kinds of causal claims because I endorse evidence-based
policy and I want to improve policy outcomes by the use of evidence. The
ﬁrst—it works somewhere—is where we are encouraged by evidence-based
policy guidelines to start. These are the kinds of claims that our best scientiﬁc
study designs can clinch. The third is where we want to end up: the proposed
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program will produce the desired outcome in the target situation as it will
be implemented there. The middle—‘general’ causal claims—is the central
route by which ‘It works somewhere’ can make for evidence that it will work
for us. But the road from ‘It works somewhere’ to ‘It will work for us’ is often
long and tortuous. There are four essential materials for building a passage
across:
1. Roman laws. I call them this on account of Luke 2:1: “And it came to
pass in those days, that there went out a decree from Caesar Augustus,
that all the world should be taxed.” The laws involved need not be re-
ally universal. But they must be wide enough to cover both the evi-
dence and the prediction the evidence is evidence for.
2. The right support team. We need all those factors without which the
policy variable cannot act.
3. Straight, sturdy ladders. So you can climb up and down across levels
of abstraction without mishap.
4. Unbroken bridges. Bywhich the inﬂuence of the cause can travel to the
effect.
You must have all four; if any one is missing, you can’t get there from here.
3. What’s an RCTand What’s It Good For? I would hope to stay away
from formulas in an address like this, but we do need some technical results
to get started. An ideal RCT for cause X and outcome Y randomly assigns
individual participants in the study, {ui}, into two groups, where X 5 x
universally in the treatment group and X5 x′ ≠ x universally in the control
group. No relevant differences are to obtain in the two groups other than X
and its downstream effects. The standard result measures the average ‘treat-
ment effect’ across the units in the study: so T average is the average of Y
in the treatment group minus its average in the control group. Of what inter-
est is this strange statistic about randomized units in a study group?
Supposing that Y values for the units in the study are determined by a causal
principle that governs the study population, the RCT can reveal something
about the role of X in this principle. Without signiﬁcant loss of generality we
can assume that the principles governing Y look like this:1
L: Y ðuÞc 5 aðuÞ1 bðuÞX ðuÞ1W ðuÞ;
where W represents the net contribution of causes that act additively in ad-
dition to X and where X may not play a role in the equation at all if b50.
So doing a little algebra (and letting hFi represent the expectation of F),
1. The important lessons follow equally for more complicated functional forms.
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hTi5 df hY ðuÞ=X ðuÞ5 xi2 hY ðuÞ=X ðuÞ5 x′i
5 haðuÞ=X ðuÞ5 xi2 haðuÞ=X ðuÞ5 x′i
1 hbðuÞ=X ðuÞ5 xix2 hb=X ðuÞ5 x′ix′
1 hW ðuÞ=X ðuÞ5 xi2 hW ðuÞ=X ðuÞ5 x′i:
Suppose, as is hoped, that the random assignment of u’s to x and x′ implies
that for u’s in the study, X is probabilistically independent of a, b, and W.
Then
T 5 hbðuÞiðx2 x′Þ:
Recall L: Y ðuÞc5aðuÞ1 bðuÞX ðuÞ1W ðuÞ. So T ≠ 0→ X is a contribut-
ing cause for Y in L.
You don’t really need to follow the details here; just note the bottom line:
If the standard assumptions for an ideal RCT are met, the average treatment
effect is the difference in X between treatment and control times b average.
So if the average treatment effect is positive, then b is too, in which case X
genuinely appears as a cause for Y in law L. This, however, provides no ev-
idence that Xwill produce a positive difference in the target unless the target
and the study share L.2 Law Lmust be general to at least that extent. But the
stretch of L is in no way addressed in the RCT, and for the most part gener-
ality cannot be taken for granted. That’s because the kinds of causal princi-
ples relevant for policy effectiveness are both local and fragile.
4. Roman Laws Are Not All That Easy to Come By. The causal laws we
rely on for reliable predictions in real policy, real technology, and real exper-
imental settings are local. They are local because they depend on the mech-
anism or the social organization, what I have called the ‘socioeconomic ma-
chine’ that gives rise to them (see Cartwright 1989). Economists know about
this kind of locality. The Chicago School notoriously used it as an argument
against government intervention: the causal principles that governments
have to hand to predict the effects of their interventions are not universal.
They arise from an underlying arrangement of individual preferences, habits,
and technology and are tied to these arrangements. Worse, according to the
Chicago School, these principles are fragile. When governments try to ma-
nipulate the causes in them to bring about the effects expected, they are likely
to alter the underlying arrangements responsible for those principles in the
ﬁrst place, so the principles no longer obtain (see Lucas 1976).
2. Or at least share the important feature of L that X genuinely appears in it.
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British econometrician Sir David Hendry urges the use of simple ‘quick
catch-up’models for forecasting rather than more realistic causal models be-
cause the world Hendry lives in is so ﬂuid that yesterday’s accurate causal
model will not be true today (see Hendry and Mizon 2011). J. S. Mill does
too. Economics cannot be an inductive science, he argued, because underly-
ing arrangements are too shaky; there’s little reason to expect that a prin-
ciple observed to hold somewhere sometime will hold elsewhere or later be-
cause there’s no guarantee the underlying arrangement of basic causes will
be the same (see Mill 1836/1967; 1843/1850, bk. VI).
Because so many of the causal principles we employ are tied to causal
structures that underpin them, you can’t just take a causal principle that ap-
plies here, no matter how sure you are of it, and suppose it will apply there.
After all, common causal structures are not all that typical, even in the lim-
ited and highly controlled world of structures we engineer. Consider for in-
stance these three toasters I found on sale in Oxford: the Cuisinart Classic
four-slice at £41.46, the Krups expert black and stainless steel at £44.99, and
the Dualit three-slice stainless steel at £158.03. Even these three toasters—
man-made and for the same job—do not have the same structure inside. (Or
at least we hope not given the big price differential.)
Perhaps you think—as many other economists and medical RCT advo-
cates seem to—that the different populations you study, here and there, are
more likely to share causal structure than are toasters. That’s ﬁne. But to be
licensed in that assumption in any given case, you better be able to produce
good evidence for it.
Simple induction is no more warranted here than anywhere else. It re-
quires stable principles, and stable principles require stable substructures to
support them. Without at least enough theory to understand the conditions
for stability, induction is entirely hit or miss. This I take it is a key point of
Princeton economist Angus Deaton’s British Academy Keynes lecture in
economics. He says of RCTs that they are “unlikely to recover quantities that
are useful for policy or understanding. Following Cartwright . . . I argue that
evidence from randomized controlled trials has no special priority. . . . The
analysis of projects needs to be refocused towards the investigation of poten-
tially generalizable mechanisms that explain why and in what contexts proj-
ects can be expected to work. . . . Thirty years of project evaluation in so-
ciology, education and criminology was largely unsuccessful because it
focused on whether projects work instead of on why they work.”3 Moving
on, let’s suppose though that (1) there are causal principles that enable X
to produce Y in the study, (2) these are shared in the target, and (3) contrary
3. Read at the academy, October 9, 2008, and published, in a revised form, as Deaton
(2009).
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to expectations from the Chicago School of economics, these principles will
be unaffected if the proposed policy is implemented in the target. There are
still three central problems for the prediction that the policy will work in the
new setting. The next problem concerns the support team necessary if X is
to produce a contribution to Y.
5. Support Teams. Return to the abstract form L for the causal law that, for
purposes of argument, we are now taking to be shared between study and
target situations:
L: Y ðuÞc5aðuÞ1 bðuÞX ðuÞ1 W ðuÞ:
The RCT tells about b. It is tempting to think of b as a constant or as an un-
decomposable randomvariable. But it isn’t. And this despite the fact that you
can ﬁnd it treated thus in sundry works in our ﬁeld (maybe not from A to Z
but at least from Cartwright to Woodward). The difference depends on the
kinds of factors that the variables represent. When I write b as a constant or
a random variable, I assume that X represents a full, not a partial, cause. But
most policy variables represent only partial causes—INUS causes, extend-
ing J. L. Mackie’s (1965) sense to multivalued variables:
X is an INUS contributor to Y: X is an insufﬁcient but nonredundant part
of a complex of factors that are unnecessary but together sufﬁcient to pro-
duce a contribution to Y.4
What matters here is that policy variables are rarely sufﬁcient to produce a
contribution; they need an appropriate support team if they are to act at all.
The support factors are represented by b.5 And the values of these factors can
be expected to vary across the units just as the values of X and W vary.
This is well known in philosophy and in social science. Nevertheless the
consequences are frequently ignored. Consider for example the usual advice
in the evidence-based policy literature about how to grade policy proposals
on the basis of evidence. The US Department of Education explains that
what you need are successful RCTs in two or more typical school settings,
including “school settings similar to yours” (2003, 10). And the Scottish In-
4. ‘Contributions’ are, at least as I make sense of them, deﬁned relative to a metaphysics
of capacities, other contributions, and laws of composition. In a law of form L, each
separate additive term on the right-hand side represents a contribution. See Cartwright
(2009).
5. In this case we are supposing that the size of the contribution of X to Y is ﬁxed once the
values of the ‘helping factors’ are set. But this contribution could still vary arbitrarily
from unit to unit. It would be more usual, though, to suppose that a full set of helping
factors would at least ﬁx the probability for a contribution of a given size.
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tercollegiate Guidelines Network, used to help set best practice for the UK
National Health Service, provides an A grade to a policy if it is supported
by “at least one meta-analysis, systematic review, or RCT rated as 111, and
directly applicable to the target population” (2011, 51). This advice is vague,
surprisingly so given how speciﬁc the guidelines are in assessing RCTs,
meta-analyses, and systematic reviews. Moreover, if properly spelled out, it
is hard to follow. Worst, it is generally bad advice.
Start with hard to follow and consider a paper by a team of authors from
Chicago, Harvard, and Brookings, “What Can We Learn about Neighbor-
hood Effects from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment?” (Ludwig et al.
2008). The paper explicitly addresses the question of where outside the ex-
perimental populationwe are entitled to suppose the experimental resultswill
obtain. The authors ﬁrst report “MTO deﬁned its eligible sample as . . . .” I
won’t read their long list because I am about to cite it in their conclusion:
“Thus MTO data . . . are strictly informative only about this population sub-
set—people residing in high-rise public housing . . . in the mid-1990s, who
were at least somewhat interested in moving and sufﬁciently organized to
take note of the opportunity and complete an application. The MTO results
should only be extrapolated to other populations if the other families, their
residential environments, and their motivations for moving are similar to
those of the MTO population” (154–55). The list is a potpourri. It seems as
if they have tossed in everything they can think of that might matter without
any systematic grounds; why, for instance, did they leave out the geograph-
ical location of the cities in the experiment? And anyway, the list gets at
what’s necessary indirectly. Look again at b in principle L and in the treat-
ment effect:
L: Y ðuÞc5aðuÞ1 bðuÞX ðuÞ 1 W ðuÞ;
hTi5 hbðuÞiðx2 x′Þ:
The term b represents in one fell swoop all the different supporting factors
necessary if X is to contribute to Y. Each separate combination of values of
these factors corresponds to a different value of b. The average treatment ef-
fect depends on the average of these values across the study population. That
means we suppose that each different arrangement of values of the support-
ing factors represented by a different value, b, of b appears in that population
with a speciﬁc probability: ProbSP(b 5 b).
So, supposing L obtains in both the study and target populations, when
can we expect hbðuÞi to be the same? Exactly when ProbSPðb5bÞ5
ProbTPðb5bÞ for all b’s, that is, when all the combinations of values of the
supporting factors have the same probability in the study and target popu-
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lations. Otherwise it is an accident of the numbers. I expect that the distri-
butions in the study population are rarely duplicated in other populations.
Independent of that, the list in theMTO article does not seem to be a list of
supporting factors. Perhaps the hope is that the list includes sufﬁcient ‘indi-
cator’ factors to ensure that populations that share these indicators will have
the same probability distributions over b. Maybe sometimes this is the best
we can do. But if we resort to it, we need some defense of why the indicators
might be up to the job. And this will be hard to provide without explicit dis-
cussion of what the supporting factors might be.
Suppose, though, we solve the problems of identifying these factors. Still
advice like that of the Department of Education is wasteful. The treatment
effect averages over arrangements for the supporting factors. Some of these
arrangements enable X to make a big contribution, others only a small con-
tribution, and for othersXmay even be counterproductive.We shouldn’t aim
for the samemix of these arrangements as in the study population but rather
for a goodmix—a mix that concentrates on arrangements that allow X to do
the most for us.
I am not alone in this view. In 1983 Edward Leamer wrote a classic paper,
“Taking the Con out of Econometrics.” The symposium discussing the An-
grist and Pischke paper was called “Con out of Economics.” Leamer’s con-
tribution to that symposium makes the same point about supporting factors I
have long argued. Here are Leamer’s words:
With interactive confounders [my ‘supporting factors’] explicitly included,
the overall treatment effect [our hbi] is not a number but a variable that
depends on the confounding effects. . . . If little thought has gone into
identifying these possible confounders, it seems probable that little thought
will be given to the limited applicability of the results in other settings.
(Leamer 2010, 35–36)
[This] is a little like the lawyer who explained that when he was a young
man he lost many cases he should have won but as he grew older he
won many that he should have lost, so that on the average justice was
done. (35)
For a ﬁnal example of sensitivity to supporting factors, return to the inte-
grated nutrition program. The need for getting the requisite supporting fac-
tors into place was not ignored in either Tamil Nadu or Bangladesh. One of
the central ideas of the nutrition program was that better nutrition can be se-
curedwithmeager resources, but to do so, mothers need to knowwhatmakes
for good nutrition. However, nobody expects that education is enough by it-
self. You can’t feed children better if you can’t feed them at all. So the edu-
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cational program for mothers was coupled with a supplemental feeding pro-
gram. Nevertheless the results were disappointing. To see what is supposed
to have gone wrong, despite the presence of a good support team, turn to my
third problem: ladders.
6. Ladders. I am a pluralist and a particularist, inclined to suspect that ev-
erything is different. Economists are often more homogenizing (though not
Hendry and Mill). They believe that they can base their economics on rela-
tively Roman laws. We are, they argue, really much the same at base, gov-
erned by the same motivations and the same laws of human nature. Gary
Becker is a notorious limiting case. Becker won the Nobel Prize for model-
ing great swathes of what we do in day-to-day life under the principles of
market equilibrium and rational choice theory, from drug addiction to racial
discrimination to crime and family relations. Basically, Becker supposes that
the agents he models act so as to maximize their expected utility. The trick is
to prescribe just what in the case under study utility consists in, which can
include anything from ﬁnancial gains to inconvenience to serious illness or
the joys of watching your spouse consume. As you will see, I shall call this
‘climbing down the ladder of abstraction’. Note that in Becker’s cases this
enterprise is relatively unconstrained, so the accounts are unfalsiﬁable, which
many of us still take to be a damning charge. As economist Robert Pollak
argues, “The devil is in the details” (2003, 120).
Angrist and Pischke seem to have an optimistic view about breadth: “any-
one who makes a living out of data analysis probably believes that heteroge-
neity is limited enough that the well-understood past can be informative
about the future” (2010, 23). As I remarked, I am suspicious about principles
of behavior that are supposed to apply almost across the board. But that is not
the source of my worries about ladders. After all, even though the speciﬁc
causal principles describing the functioning of the Cuisinart, the Dualit, and
the Krups toasters are all different, still I agree that there are a set of even
more basic principles that all three share. Even assuming shared princi-
ples and laying aside worries about falsiﬁability, trouble looms: There may
be a set of laws that enable X to be a contributing cause to Y in the study and
these lawsmay be shared with the target, but in the target they do not connect
X and Y. That’s because what counts as a realization of a given factor in the
study often cannot do so in the target.
This problem arises because of the way properties at different levels of
abstraction piggyback on one another. To use vocabulary familiar from an-
other problem area, abstract features are generally multiply realizable at the
concrete level, but the abstract does not supervene on the concrete. The
causes in a causal principle can be more or less abstract; because of the pig-
gybacking, principles involving factors at different levels can all obtain at
once. On a sphere, ‘The trajectories of bodies moving subject only to in-
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ertia are great circles’ is true; so too is ‘The trajectories of bodies moving
subject only to inertia are geodesics (i.e., the shortest distance between
two points)’. They are equally true because on a sphere, being a great cir-
cle is to be a geodesic.6 For spheres there’s a ‘ladder’ down from the ab-
stract ‘geodesic’ to the more concrete ‘great circle’, but there is no such
ladder for Euclidean surfaces.
Generally the higher the level of abstraction of a causal principle, the
more widely it is shared across populations. Bodies on Euclidean planes sub-
ject only to inertia follow geodesics but not great circles. And the lower the
level, the more likely that the principle is only locally true. This can make
serious problems when it comes to the stretch of the principles that RCTs can
establish. The Bangladesh nutrition program provides a vivid example.
Therewas good evidence that the integrated nutrition program hadworked
in 20,000 Indian villages. But it failed on average in Bangladeshi sites.
Looking at the standard account of what went wrong, we will see that issues
about levels of abstraction were at the heart. Nothing in this account sup-
poses that Bangladeshis and Indians are altogether different. On the contrary,
it seems likely they share a common principle that allowed the program to
improve children’s nutrition in India. But this principle couldn’t do the same
job in Bangladesh because things in Bangladesh just aren’t what they are
in India.
I imagine those who adopted the program in Bangladesh expected Ban-
gladesh and India to share a simple, commonsense principle:
Principle 1. Better nutritional knowledge in mothers plus food supplied
by the project for supplemental feeding improves the nutritional status of
their children.
But they did not. The ﬁrst reason for the lack of impact in Bangladesh, it
seems, was ‘leakage’: The food supplied by the project was often not used
as a supplement but as a substitute, with the usual food allocation for that
child passing to another member of the family (Save the Children 2003). The
principle ‘Better nutritional knowledge in mothers plus food supplied by the
project for supplemental feeding improves children’s nutrition’ was true in
the original successful cases but not in Bangladesh. This suggests that a bet-
ter shot at a shared principle would be:
6. I shall here be relatively cavalier about the metaphysics of properties. I treat both
abstract features and concrete ones as real, and I treat them as different features even if
having one of these (the more concrete feature) is what constitutes having the more
abstract one on any occasion. I take it that claims like this can be rendered appropriately,
though probably differently, in various different metaphysical accounts of properties.
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Principle 2. Better nutritional knowledge in mothers plus supplemental
feeding of children improves children’s nutrition.
This is a principle about features at a higher level of abstraction than those in
the ﬁrst principle. In the successful cases in India the more concrete feature
‘food supplied by the project’ constituted the more abstract feature ‘supple-
mental feeding’. But not in Bangladesh. There the ladders are missing that
connect the abstract features in the shared principles with the concrete fea-
tures offered by the program.
A second major reason for the lack of positive impact is also a problem
with connecting ladders between the abstract and the concrete. It’s labeled
‘the mother-in-law factor’ by HowardWhite, who also points out what I call
‘the man factor’: “The program targeted the mothers of young children. But
mothers are frequently not the decision makers . . . with respect to the health
and nutrition of their children. For a start, women do not go tomarket in rural
Bangladesh; it is men who do the shopping. And for women in joint house-
holds—meaning they live with their mother-in-law—as a sizeable minority
do, then the mother-in-law heads the women’s domain. Indeed, project par-
ticipation rates are signiﬁcantly lower for women living with their mother-
in-law in more conservative parts of the country” (2009, 6). This suggests
yet another proposal for a shared principle:
Principle 3. Better nutritional knowledge results in better nutrition for a
child in those who (a) provide the child with supplemental feeding, (b) con-
trol what food is procured, (c) control how food gets dispensed, and (d ) hold
the child’s interests as central in performing b and c.
Just as the food supplied by the project did not count as supplemental feeding
in the Bangladesh program, mothers in that program did not in general sat-
isfy the more abstract descriptions in points b and c.
The all-too-common fact that things in one setting may not be what they
are in another makes real trouble for the use of RCTs as evidence. The pre-
vious successes of the program in India are relevant to predictions about the
Bangladesh program only relative to the vertical identiﬁcation of mothers
with the more abstract features in points b, c, and d. But not all of these iden-
tiﬁcations hold. So the previous successes are not evidentially relevant.
7. Roman Laws, Ladders, and Structural Parameters. The lesson of
BINP is that the way abstract and concrete features relate implies that (1) in
different contexts the same isn’t always the same, and (2) this limits the use-
fulness of claims of ‘it works somewhere’ for predicting ‘it will work for us’.
But the very same facts about the relations between the abstract and the con-
crete equally imply: (1′) In different contexts very different things can be the
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same. And because of this, (2′) claims of ‘it works somewhere’ can support
policy predictions in contexts far away and very different from the study
populations that warrant them. Angrist and Pischke employ this in their com-
mendation of RCTs. “Small ball sometimes wins big games,” they tell us
(2010, 25). How so? Because sometimes from RCTS, they urge, you can
learn ‘structural econometric parameters’, where following David Hendry,
“Structure . . . is deﬁned as the set of basic features of the economy which
are invariant to [various speciﬁc] changes in that economy,” including “an
extension of the sample” (Hendry and Mizon 2010, 1–2). How wide an ex-
tension? That depends on the theory. For the moment let us assume, wide
enough at least to cover the policy target.
Suppose that in the study a structural law of form L allows X to cause Y.
Then b from that law is a structural parameter. Because b is a structural pa-
rameter, b ≠0 in the study population shows that it’s unequal to 0 in exten-
sions of the population. This line of reasoning is familiar. Because the grav-
itational constantG is a structural parameter, Galileo can measure it on balls
rolling down inclined planes and Euler a century later can put the same G
into formulas calculating the ‘true curve’ of cannonballs that are subject to
the buoyant and resistant forces of the air as well as to gravity.
The parameter discussed by Angrist and Pischke is the “intertemporal
[labor supply] substitution elasticity” (2010, 4), that is, a parameter that
represents how much transitory wage changes contribute to hours of work
a worker supplies. This is a theoretical parameter in, for example, life cycle
theory. Is it constant enough for Angrist and Pischke to play the Galileo-
Euler game? Maybe, maybe not. As Angus Deaton remarked in a private
conversation, “Structural parameters are in the eye of the beholder.” Or ac-
cording toMervyn King, governor of the Bank of England (in a paper read at
the Royal Society, March 22, 2010), “There are probably few genuinely
‘deep’ (and therefore stable) parameters or relationships in economics.”
I don’t know if the labor supply elasticity is a structural parameter or how
far the structure stretches if it is. But Angrist and Pischke must take it that
way. Here is the longer passage from which I quoted before: “Small ball
sometimes wins big games. In our ﬁeld, some of the best research designs
used to estimate labor supply elasticities exploit natural and experimenter-
induced variation in speciﬁc labor markets. Oettinger . . . analyzes stadium
vendors’ reaction to wage changes driven by changes in attendance, while
Fehr and Goette . . . study bicycle messengers in Zurich who, in a controlled
experiment, received higher commission rates for one month only” (2010,
25). Oettinger’s (1999) analysis of stadium vendors at major league baseball
games supposes that the vendors’ expectations about the size of the crowd
constitute their wage expectations, and in turn their wage expectations con-
stitute ‘laborers’ wage expectations’ in this case. Similarly, the number of
vendors constitutes the labor supply in this case. So Angrist and Pischke
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seem to assume that labor supply elasticity is a structural parameter and that
the parameter connecting vendors’ expectations of crowd size with the num-
ber of vendors showing up at the stadium is the labor supply elasticity in this
situation.
What warrants these two assumptions? We confront here the twin prob-
lems of Roman laws and warranted ladders. For the ﬁrst, it is usually theory
that teaches that there is a structural parameter, but it had best be a credible
well-supported theory. As to the second, we need help in both climbing up
the ladder of abstraction in the study situation and then, in new settings,
climbing down. How do we know that what Oettinger measured on his sta-
dium vendors was an instantiation of the labor supply parameter? And when
we turn to a new situationwith this parameter in hand, how dowe ﬁgurewhat
concrete features count as labor supply elasticity there? Theory can help. But
it will also take sound knowledge of the local context. The point is that stud-
ies like Galileo’s and Oettinger’s—and RCTs—can measure structural param-
eters, but they cannot tell us that there is a structural parameter to be mea-
sured. That information must come from elsewhere.
8. UnbrokenBridges. My ﬁnal problem involves causal chains. Generally
getting from cause to effect is not a one-step process. Rather the policy
variable is at the head of a causal chain with the hoped-for outcome at
the tail, with a number of links in between. Policy X causes outcome Y
in the study situation because X causes U which causes V which causes W
which causes . . . which causes Y. We can expect X to cause Y in a different
situation only as long as the chain is unbroken.
Consider ﬁgure 1 and look at the ﬁrst step. What enables X to cause U? I
have been arguing that it is often not because of a general principle connect-
ingX andU but rather becauseX andU are concretizations of featuresX1 and
U1 at a higher level of abstraction, where X1 and U1 are joined by a reason-
ably general principle. Similarly, U may cause V not because of a principle
connecting U and V but rather because of a general principle between more
Figure 1. Two routes from a cause to an effect, at different levels of abstraction.
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abstract features U2 and V1 that they instantiate. Note the new subscripts.
There is no reason that the very same features under which U is the effect of
X should be the feature in virtue of which U is the cause of V.
Let me illustrate with a possible example social workers have been wor-
rying about from UK child welfare policy in which a child’s caregivers are
heavily encouraged, perhaps badgered, into attending parenting classes. It is
illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
Considermaking fathers attend parenting classes. Different cultures in the
United Kingdom have widely different views about the roles fathers should
play in parenting. Compelling fathers to attend parenting classes can instan-
tiate themore abstract feature, ‘ensuring caregivers are better informed about
ways to help the child’, in which case it can be expected to be positively ef-
fective for improving a child’s welfare. But it may also instantiate the more
abstract feature ‘public humiliation’, in which case it could act oppositely.
Attending classes as a result of pressure can constitute a public humiliation
and by virtue of being a public humiliation can lead to aggressive and violent
behavior, whichmay be directed toward the child. There is then no unbroken
bridge at the level of the more widely applicable principle, but there is a
linked-up sequence at the more concrete level.
This of course has mixed policy implications. If we found that pressing
fathers to attend parenting classes in this cultural group led to negative out-
comes, that would not mean it should be expected to do so in other groups.
The general principles that affect the different populations may be the same,
but they don’t make an unbroken bridge for the negative effects to move
along. However, getting positive results in other groups in which the humil-
iation mechanism is not activated does not tell us what will be the overall
outcome where it is activated. This is yet another case in which knowing that
a policy works—or fails—somewhere is at best a starting point for ﬁguring
out if it will work for us.
Figure 2. Example of a “broken bridge.”
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9. Conclusion. We can do better at predicting policy effectiveness. And
philosophy helps show how. RCTs can help too, as their advocates maintain.
But, as I have argued, it is a long and tortuous road from learning that a policy
works somewhere, which is the kind of claim an RCTcan clinch, to correctly
predicting that it will—or won’t—work for you. And you can go wrong in
both directions: accepting programs that won’t work for you, as Levy claims
has repeatedly happened with Progresa, and rejecting ones that would, like
the J-PAL rejection of textbooks in favor of deworming, or in my hypothe-
sized example, sending caregivers who won’t feel humiliated to parenting
classes.
I’ve rehearsed four essential materials it takes to secure a safe pathway:
(1) shared laws, (2) supports, (3) ladders, and (4) laws that interlock. Nomat-
ter how secure the starting point, if any one of these is missing, you just can’t
get there from here.
I don’t need to remind you that a conclusion is only as secure as its weak-
est premise. RCTs may be the gold standard for underpinning the start point,
but you can’t pave the road in between with gold bricks. Evidence for these
other factors is necessarily different and varied in form: theory, big and little,
consilience of inductions, and a great deal of local information about study
and target situations. Philosophy matters because once you know what you
need, you can hunt for it. And often you can ﬁnd it. Here is Howard White
again: “In the Bangladesh case, identiﬁcation of the ‘mother-in-law’ effect
came from reading anthropological literature” (2009, 15). But to ﬁnd it you
must be encouraged to look. And where it doesn’t exist, the sciences must be
encouraged to uncover it. It’s no good just putting all your money into gold
bricks.
We philosophers of science are faced then with a hard job. Here as else-
where in the natural and social sciences, in policy, and in technology, we can
help. But to do so we need to ﬁgure out how better to engage with scientiﬁc
practice and not just with each other.
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